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Some Thoughts on Public Policy 
and Industrial Peace 
Bryan M. Downie 
This paper examines various stratégies for industrial peace. 
Stratégies which attack both the root causes ofconflict and the ef-
fects of labour-management strife are discussed. The author then 
draws some broad inferences for public policy and for the parties 
in collective bargaining. 
The view has been expressed repeatedly over the past fifteen years that 
collective bargaining is archaic, that it is not working, and that strikes are 
obsolète and should be replaced as a dispute seulement mechanism. The 
term industrial relations could be substituted for collective bargaining 
because our collective bargaining System is simply a reflection of the larger 
industrial relations system. The above sentiments are expressed in the 
phrase, "there must be a better way". Moreover, there does seem to be a 
clear need for expérimentation in our collective bargaining and industrial 
relations Systems because of the pivotai position of industrial relations in 
the Canadian economy. 
No one has thoroughly thought through the most appropriate straté-
gies for industrial peace and the interrelationship between various straté-
gies. This paper présents a framework to categorize and better understand 
various change stratégies, broadly classifies thèse stratégies into four 
groups, gives examples of each strategy, and sets forth the implications for 
policy makers and the parties in collective bargaining. The material pre-
sented is not new. Rather, the paper présents a synthesis of existing mate-
rials and expériences in industrial relations. 
Given the characteristics of collective bargaining (adversarial) and the 
nature of the broader industrial relations problem, what viable approaches 
exist to improve the functioning of the industrial relations System while pro-
tecting the rights of unions and employées? What new approaches yet un-
tried could be introduced to effect change? There hâve been a great many 
stratégies proposed to change our industrial relations system. Some strate-
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gies are already in use to a limited degree; others hâve simply been discussed 
or used very sparingly; some hâve never been used in Canada. The attempt 
hère is to gather ail of thèse together, focus on a total package of solutions, 
and help practitioners and those interested in policy think through the pro-
blem of facilitating change. In the next section the broad range of change 
stratégies are categorized and in ensuing sections they are discussed in some 
depth. 
BROAD APPROACHES TO CHANGE THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
SYSTEM 
The industrial relations System can be improved through three mecha-
nisms - through législative change, through the initiative of the parties, or 
through a mixed (public-private) approach. Figure 1 portrays some of the 
possibilities within the major orientations or approaches just noted. At the 
bottom of each approach is an example of a strategy if the fundamental 
causes of labor-management conflict (such as mistrust) are attacked. For 
example, one of the purposes of industrial democracy is to increase partici-
pation, and hence power-sharing, by employées. This in turn may change 
employer-employée attitudes and improve relationships. The rniddle row 
shows techniques employed to deal with bot h causes and effects (e.g., 
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strikes and lockouts). An example of this approach is préventive or early 
médiation which attempts to avoid strikes and lockouts by generating a pro-
blem solving approach by the parties. The top row includes some sample 
mechanisms which could be adopted if only the effects are treated. Arbitra-
tion is perhaps the most frequently suggested mechanism to this end. 
To improve the system, then, the problem can be attacked from a num-
ber of standpoints. The entries in the body of Figure 1 are simply illustrative 
stratégies that hâve been tried or recommended; they are by no means ex-
haustive. Taking the framework a step further ail change stratégies may be 
classified under the following four catégories: 
(1) public policy reform; 
(2) structural reform; 
(3) procédural reform; and 
(4) attitudinal reform. 
Most proposais will fall under one of the above catégories; some will 
fall under two. Législative solutions will typically fall under catégories one 
and two above, while private solutions will fall under three and four. There 
could be overlap, however, and it is clear that no one category contains ail 
the answers in terms of improvements to our industrial relations System. As 
one moves down the catégories, there is movement from solutions which 
simply attack effects to solutions which attempt to treat the fundamental 
causes of industrial conflict. Therefore, the latter solutions are more likely 
to effect major and permanent change. A current example which demons-
trates the weakness of public policy reform was the passage of Bill 100 and 
its effect on bargaining in Ontario primary and secondary éducation. One 
purpose was to bring out a greater degree of harmony in teacher-school 
board collective bargaining. Although there appears to be a réduction in 
strike activity, there are no signs five years after its passage that teacher-
board relations hâve improved. Bill 100 is well drafted and effective législa-
tion, but more time and new initiatives are required before significant 
reform takes place. Public policy reform is, nevertheless, the category most 
industrial relations experts focus on when proposing change and will be 
discussed first. 
PUBLIC POLICY REFORM 
A large measure of responsibility for collective bargaining - its nature, 
outcomes and conséquences - lies in the hands of government (in Canada, 
provincial or fédéral depending upon the industry). Government can aid the 
bargaining process in a variety of ways which are outlined below. 
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Facilitating the Negotiation Process 
There are traditional ways by which government has attempted to aid 
the bargaining process. Most notable and widely used is the provision for 
voluntary médiation or conciliation to assist the parties. A government 
agency may train mediators and then simply offer the services of such indi-
viduals. As an alternative approach, government may provide for compul-
sory médiation and fact finding before légal strikes or lockouts can occur. 
The compulsory two-stage conciliation process prévalent at one time in 
most Canadian jurisdictions is an example and this process also is a part of 
the legislated approach for dealing with railway disputes in the United 
States. A number of variations on this basic thème are possible. Bill 100, for 
example, provides for voluntary médiation but compulsory fact finding in 
teacher-school board disputes in Ontario. 
Thèse techniques constitute a relatively light handed approach to 
government intervention. In the same vein is the provision by government 
of a data base for the parties so that in negotiations they hâve common in-
formation. The Education Relations Commission gathers salary and work-
ing conditions information and distributes it to both sides involved in col-
lective bargaining in Ontario éducation. The Pay Research Bureau under 
the stipulations of the Public Service Staff Relations Act provides data to 
both parties negotiating in the Fédéral public service. 
There are, then, a number of devices government can provide on an ex 
ante basis to assist, at least theoretically, the parties in their search for an 
agreement. If ail else fails in important disputes, this type of intervention 
may be extended to include the entry of government politicians to effect, or 
attempt to effect, resolution. It should be noted in passing, however, that 
some would argue that, although some of the above stratégies hâve influ-
enced the bargaining process, they hâve not facilitated it. This is particu-
larly the case with forced government intervention and the intrusion, 
welcome or not, of politicians. 
There does seem to be fairly broad consensus, however, that third par-
ty assistance is helpful if both sides voluntarily request the présence of a 
mediator. A major contribution of government, therefore, is in the area of 
providing mediators and discovering new intervention techniques. Third 
party intervention in a variety of settings is currently enjoying increased at-
tention and interest. A better understanding of the process is emerging, as 
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well as new methods1. One of the more promising proposais, of course, is 
"med-arb". Hère, by agreement of the parties in advance, a single individ-
ual has the responsibility and authority to both médiate and, if necessary, 
arbitrate a dispute. The point has been made elsewhere, however, that many 
arbitrators in the past attempted to médiate prior to writing their award2. In 
essence, med-arb does not take us much beyond what has already occurred. 
Substitutes for Economie Sanctions 
Thus far, government has been unable to corne up with a viable, ef-
fective and mutually acceptable strike and lockout substitute. This is not 
because of a scarcity of proposais. There has always been a préoccupation 
in Canada with proposais to prevent, or limit, économie sanctions3. 
Based on past expérience, however, it is simply not realistic to expect 
much progress on this front. Ail proposais hâve fundamental limitations. 
The basic problems, however, are that the strike cannot be legislated out of 
existence unless at the same time effective collective bargaining is ensured, 
and that improved union-management relationships cannot be legislated. 
Conventional compulsory arbitration, for example, may lead to so many 
disputes being resolved by that method (the so-called "narcotic effect"), 
with so many unresolved items going to arbitration (the "chilling effect"), 
that the solution itself may lead to frustration and ultimately illégal strikes. 
There are disadvantages of compulsory arbitration (conventional and final-
offer) that are well known and need not be expounded in this paper4. Suf-
fice it to say that compulsory arbitration may not lead to effective or pro-
ductive collective bargaining or to healthy labour-management relation-
ships. Other solutions would be only partial solutions, would dramatically 
and unfairly shift the balance of bargaining power, or would be ineffective 
or inopérable. 
i A professional organization of third party neutrals has recently been formed (The 
Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution), and numerous books and articles hâve been 
written on the process. See, for example, Oran R. YOUNG, The Intermediaries: Third Parties 
in International Crises, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1967; William E. 
SIMKIN, Médiation and the Dynamics of Collective Bargaining, Washington, The Bureau of 
National Affairs, 1971 and Richard E. WALTON, Interpersonal Peacemaking: Confronta-
tions and Third Party Consultation, Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 
1969. 
2 CUSHMAN, B., "Current Experiments in Collective Bargaining", Industrial Rela-
tions Research Association, Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual Winter Meeting, 
December 1973, p. 133. 
3 JAMIESON, Stuart, Industrial Relations in Canada, Toronto, The Macmillan Com-
pany of Canada, Limited, 1975, pp. 116-142. 
4 For a discussion of thèse see Bryan M. DOWNIE, The Behavioral, Economie and In-
stitutional Effects of Compulsory Interest Arbitration, Ottawa, Economie Council of Canada, 
Discussion Paper no. 147, December 1979. 
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Encouraging Labour-Management Coopération 
An indirect approach which would fall under the heading of "Encour-
aging Labour-Management Coopération" is the support of quality of work 
life (QWL) initiatives by labour and management. Labour Canada has been 
engaged in just such a project. The program was designed to facilitate 
voluntary QWL experiments rather than force new initiatives on the parties. 
The province of Ontario has mounted a somewhat similar program in its 
labour department. Through information gathering and dissémination, plus 
the delivery of QWL expertise when requested by the parties, government 
can play a rôle in the formation of coopérative ventures at the work site. 
The formation of semi-autonomous work groups, job redesign and job 
enrichment experiments, joint labour-management committees, and other 
related activities that generally are included under the broad title of quality 
of work life should help to integrate the interests of labour and management 
and, thus, enhance the prospects for industrial peace and increased produc-
tivity5. 
This approach is quite différent from industrial democracy or worker 
participation required and enforced through législation. A législative solu-
tion has generally been rejected as not logical or désirable in Canada 
because of the nature and structure of the country's labour and manage-
ment institutions and its System of collective bargaining and government6. 
STRUCTURAL REFORM 
A limited but, nevertheless, a distinct strategy for change involves 
changing the structure of bargaining. The purpose of structural reform is to 
shift the application of a set of negotiations (and/or the collective agree-
ment) to a larger configuration so that the number of strikes is decreased. 
Concurrently, the size of strikes (in terms of numbers of employées involv-
ed) would be increased. For example, there is currently in Canada emphasis 
on increasing the effective size of bargaining units with spécifie emphasis on 
more multi-unit (industry or sector wide) bargaining, particularly in the 
public sector and in construction. It is hoped that this will alleviate whip-
sawing and the séries of seemingly endless negotiations in public and bell-
weather sectors. One big strike rather than a séries of smaller but neverthe-
less damaging strikes would be the resuit. 
5 For a thorough discussion of QWL see The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 
Spécial Issue, "Collaboration in Work Settings", vol. 13, no. 3, 1977. 
6 See, for example, John CRISPO, Industrial Democracy in Western Europe: A North 
American Perspective, Toronto, McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1978 and John CRISPO, The 
Canadian Industrial Relations System, Toronto, McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1978, pp. 
538-545. 
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The idea of reforming bargaining structure in order to bring about 
more stability and peace is not a new one, and not only the government but 
also the parties themselves may be the force behind such a move. However, 
public policy does play a primary rôle in the détermination of bargaining 
unit size and character through certifying an "appropriate bargaining 
unit". As well, government can encourage or make possible new bargaining 
arrangements which entail structural change. For example, officiais from 
Labour Canada hâve been vocal advocates of, and hâve placed major em-
phasis on, much larger units to ameliorate the malaise in public sector bar-
gaining, particularly in grain handling. The Prime Minister emphasized the 
same need to the Canadian Labour Congress several years ago. It is impor-
tant to note that to facilitate broad based bargaining the Fédéral Govern-
ment would hâve to waive certain restrictions in, say, the grain handling 
situation because some units corne under the jurisdiction of the Canada 
Labour Code, while others fall under the Public Service Staff Relations 
Act. 
Alternatively, structural reform may be introduced directly through a 
change in public policy. An Inquiry Commission on Wider-Based Collective 
Bargaining (the Bairstow Commission) was established by the Fédéral 
Government to study the problem at the fédéral level and législation may 
flow from the Commission's récent recommendations7. In Ontario, légis-
lation has been passed to provide for and implement province-wide bar-
gaining in certain sectors of the construction industry. The stated purpose is 
to provide better labour relations in that sector. The Matthews Commission 
which is examining teacher-board bargaining in Ontario is considering, 
among other things, the possibility of enlarging the size of negotiating units. 
Structural change need not corne through government initiative. An ex-
ample of structural reform occurred in the railway industry several years 
ago. The impetus came from the railway unions but with the encouragement 
7 See Report of the Inquiry Commission on Wider-Based Collective Bargaining, 
Ottawa, Minister of Supply and Services, December 1978. The Commission, chaired by 
Frances Bairstow, made a number of important recommendations. The most significant one 
recommended that the médiation function be segregated out of Labour Canada and be placed 
in a new independent agency entitled the Fédéral Médiation and Conciliation Service. The 
report also recommended restructuring of bargaining units on a voluntary basis under the 
guidance and assistance of the FMCS. While sympathetic to the gênerai thrust of the report, 
the position of the Canadian Labour Congress is that the recommendations would weaken 
Labour Canada and, therefore, possibly would be dysfunctional from the perspective of the 
Congress. Officiais from Labour Canada are, quite naturally, apprehensive that a séparation 
of functions would weaken the labour portfolio. On the issue of broader based bargaining, the 
parties who would be affected apparently opposed the concept. Overall there is antipathy 
towards a change to larger units at this time, although the report per se was well received. 
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of rail management. Recently, the seventeen unions in the industry formed 
a coalition known as the common front or more formally as the Association 
of Railway Unions. The formation of the coalition made negotiations 
somewhat more manageable and allowed the introduction of small but posi-
tive innovations in the bargaining process. It also prevents whipsawing of 
the unions by management. This point hints, however, at one of the disad-
vantages of structural reform. Such changes hâve an impact on bargaining 
power. Indeed, the main reason for consolidation may be to increase the 
bargaining power of one side at the bargaining table. 
The above also points to the major weakness of tinkering with the 
structure of bargaining. Structural change, which involves a move to larger 
units clearly does not constitute or resuit in more positive labour-
management attitudes. Moving to a larger unit may only make the bargain-
ing process more manageable and possibly make procédural innovations 
more feasible. 
The argument has also been made that the smaller the unit, the greater 
the Hkelihood of solving employee-employer problems at the level where 
problems actually arise. In larger units, local problems are difficult, if not 
impossible, to understand let alone résolve8. Perhaps of most conséquence 
is the difficulty in ensuring any effective local union or management in-
volvement and input. In fact, a move to larger units may work at cross pur-
poses with attempts to improve labour-management relations because it 
removes décisions from the local level where attitudinal improvement must 
take place in order to truly improve the industrial relations System. Also, 
wage inequities within large units are generally compounded, and other 
bargaining rigidities seem to be a natural outcome of aggregation. Finally, 
larger units generally are the resuit of coalitions and coalitions tend to be 
unstable and break up. This is especially the case in face of the types of 
pressures just outlined. It is germane to note that the Association of Rail-
way Unions previously mentioned is currently in the process of fragmenta-
tion. 
In short, there is nothing inherently superior in large units and the 
benefits are likely to be adventitious. The hope for increased labour peace 
and productive joint dealings probably does not réside in structural change. 
Nevertheless, this type of reform may be of some limited short run help in a 
small number of spécial cases. 
8 The pragmatic case for a disaggregated structure has been put by Edward 
CUSHMAN, "Management Objectives in Collective Bargaining", in Arnold R. Weber (éd.), 
The Structure of Collective Bargaining: Problems and Perspectives, New York, The Free 
Press, 1961, pp. 59-75. 
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PROCEDURAL REFORM 
Thus far, the discussion has been on solutions or reforms that treat ef-
fects (i.e., strikes) largely through impasse resolution techniques and struc-
tural changes. Reforms in thèse areas are important but alone they will not 
create the degree of change that is so désirable today. Yet, ironically, indus-
trial relations experts and politicians hâve been preoccupied for the most 
part with dispute settlement mechanisms and structural adaptations. It is 
therefore important to note that various types of reform are possible 
through the initiative of the parties. Illustrations of thèse are itemized in this 
and the next section. 
Private Substitutes for Economie Sanctions 
An important step in reforming the bargaining process and moving the 
parties away from the win-lose syndrome is the imposition of a sanction 
substitute by the mutual agreement of the parties. There is an emerging con-
sensus now in industrial relations that, while interest arbitration imposed by 
government as a strike substitute may be harmful to collective bargaining, 
voluntary arbitration is a workable option. That is, voluntary arbitration 
actually may not destroy the give-and-take of collective bargaining. David 
Cole put the case for voluntary interest arbitration most forcefully. 
As I hâve said on other occasions, to insist that we cannot hâve collective 
bargaining without depending on the strike is like saying that if we re-
nounce war we cannot hâve diplomacy. To me, precisely the contrary is 
true9. 
The best known experiment along thèse Unes, of course, has occurred 
between the United Steelworkers of America and the major U.S. steel com-
panies which bargain together as an industry-wide group. In 1971, the par-
ties signed the Expérimental Negotiation Agreement (ENA). In return for a 
no-strike pledge by the union, there is a provision for voluntary arbitration 
of ail unresolved disputes by a three-man arbitration board. 
There are those who favour innovation in industrial relations but not 
voluntary arbitration because they favour resolution of disputes through 
the efforts of the two sides alone. The idea of voluntary arbitration, 
however, is that it would rarely be used. Jacob Finkleman, when he was 
chairman of the Public Service Staff Relations Board, noted in an address 
9 COLE, David L., "Rôle of the National Commission for Industrial Peace", In-
dustrial Relations Research Association, Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual Winter 
Meeting, December 1973, p. 156. 
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to the Electrical Contractors Association of Ontario in 1972 that in the 
Ontario Clothing Industry voluntary arbitration was used for thirty years 
and that the number of contract disputes referred by the parties to arbitra-
tion were "very, very few". As another example, the parties hâve not used 
arbitration in the U.S. steel industry. But, if negotiations do break down 
and two parties hâve managed to improve their relationship under a System 
of voluntary arbitration, they can résolve their dispute with a minimum 
amount of disruption and without destroying any positive innovations that 
hâve been introduced. 
Attempts to Streamline Bargaining 
One of the main sources of delays in bargaining is the exercise of 
various gambits and ploys. As an example, gamesmanship with respect to 
the agenda is almost always prévalent in bargaining. Unions typically want 
to consider one item at a time and management, fearing that union negotia-
tors will "nickel-and-dime them to death" invariably express the necessity 
for a total package approach. Negotiations often become bogged down over 
precisely this issue. 
A compromise and a possible way out of the above dilemma is to 
mutually agrée to a "parameter approach" to bargaining. An example is 
provided by rail negotiations in Canada. Three bargaining rounds ago the 
parties agreed to that type of approach on the économie package. Rather 
than tackling one fringe benefit at a time, the parties sorted out the items 
that both were willing and /or wanting to discuss. They then mutually 
agreed to the magnitude of past fringe benefit increases in old agreements 
(verified at 2 percent of payroll on two-year agreements). Because the par-
ties were discussing a one-year agreement, the "parameter" for fringes was 
established as 1 percent of payroll. The companies then allowed the unions 
to follow basically a "cafétéria" approach to fringes within that parameter. 
This helped speed up negotiations considerably and allowed the parties to 
get to the second parameter and hard core issue ~ wages. 
A second way to streamline the bargaining process is to reduce the 
volume of issues. It has been demonstrated that, through hard work, the 
parties can streamline the agenda. Ontario Hydro and the Ontario Hydro 
Employées Union recognized and attacked this problem directly. They 
reduced the number of issues from 270 in their 1972 negotiations to 90 in 
their 1975 negotiations. At Labatts Breweries in Edmonton recently, only 
nine items were up for negotiation. This was the resuit of efforts to reform 
the bargaining process10. Also, in some cases, very complex issues hâve been 
io Financial Post, November 8, 1975. 
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set aside to be determined outside of collective bargaining. This has occur-
red in railway bargaining. 
Therefore, at least three things may be done to streamline the bargain-
ing process: use a parameter approach on money items; reduce the number 
of issues; and set aside complex issues. Through thèse procédures the agen-
da is reduced and the extent of gamesmanship attenuated. 
Early Negotiations 
Research findings hâve indicated that a sufficient period of time, and 
one free of deadlines, is necessary for problem solving and win-win rather 
than win-lose behaviour to take place11. In light of this, it is not surprising 
that in some relationships the parties hâve deliberately set aside extra time 
as a strategy for peaceful conflict resolution. "Early-bird negotiations", as 
they are referred to, hâve been used on numerous occasions and with suc-
cess. We can use the three cases referred to earlier in this connection 
(Ontario Hydro, the railway industry and the U.S. steel industry). In each 
case, the parties agreed to start their negotiations much earlier than usual. 
A Target Date for Seulement 
The above suggests another procédural reform. It seems to be impor-
tant to hâve a target date for settlement and/or a well thought out time 
frame for negotiations. A target date, it should be emphasized, is much dif-
férent from a deadline. The latter connotes a threat and implies adverse 
conséquences. A target is a goal to strive for and has much less threat at-
tached to it. 
A preconceived and spécifie time séquence for negotiations was agreed 
upon by both sides at Ontario Hydro. This plan contained a target date for 
settlement and the parties reached agreement prior to that date. The EN A in 
U.S. stell also is very definite on this point. National negotiations must 
begin in mid-January with a target date for settlement of mid-April. The 
parties hâve always reached agreement on schedule. While there was no for-
mal plan in Canadian rail negotiations in 1974, both sides came to the table 
exceedingly well prepared and had individually developed a time frame for 
negotiations. Their time frames were similar, and an informai target date of 
November 1 (two months prior to contract expiry) was agreed to by the two 
sides. This target was missed by only a couple of days. 
il For a review of the literature on problem solving, see Rensis and Jane LIKERT, New 
Ways of Managing Conflict, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1976, pp. 141-155. 
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Early-bird negotiations and the setting of a target date for settlement 
help mute the dysfunctional aspects of deadline setting. By removing dead-
line pressure, thèse two aspects in conjunction also allow more considéra-
tion of items on the agenda and may facilitate a more thoughtful search 
process. Finally, the extra time available may lead the parties to interact 
more as a working committee than as protagonists. 
A Wage Détermination Formula and Common Data 
Settlements in collective bargaining cannot be generated by a formula 
to set salaries. But the application of a wage détermination formula may be 
of some utility in conflict resolution. The use by the parties of a mutually 
acceptable wage détermination formula stimulâtes the use of "facts" and, 
hence, helps to depersonalize the conflict. The use of wage guidelines in col-
lective bargaining under Canada's anti-inflation program is an example of 
this12. To a certain extent guidelines substitute the application of a bargain-
ing framework for the use of raw power13. A better illustration is provided, 
again, by the rail negotiations. In that case, a formula for negotiations was 
agreed to by both sides after Justice Emmett Hall supplied the parties with 
the formula in his arbitration award to résolve a dispute in the early 1970's. 
The détails of the formula are not particularly germane. The most impor-
tant fact has been that, in the wage rounds since that time, both groups hâve 
been committed to its use. 
Very différent numbers, of course, may be used in, and therefore deriv-
ed from, such a formula. Its use, nevertheless, has three positive effects 
with respect to the negotiation process in addition to those mentioned 
above. First, it helps immeasurably in setting limits to the contest, so to 
speak, because both sides are committed to it and discuss their proposais in 
terms of "Hall". This is an important contribution in that it reduces the ac-
tual sizeable gap which typically séparâtes, at least initially, two parties 
entering negotiations. Of perhaps more importance, it reduces the perceived 
gap initially separating them and thus helps to prevent escalation of the con-
flict. Second, its use allows the parties to more accurately gauge or envision 
where the final bargaining range will be. There are only so many rational 
applications of the formula, and through negotiations the various options 
12 See also Rensis LIKERT and Jane LIKERT, op. cit., pp. 161-162, for the efficacy of 
this approach. 
13 For a discussion of this see Bryan M. DOWNIE, Wage-Price Controls and Collective 
Bargaining, Kingston, Ontario, Queen's University Industrial Relations Centre, Reprint Séries 
no. 29, 1976. 
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rapidly décline in number. To a negotiator this is no small contribution 
because the bargaining process is full of uncertainty including the area 
within which final offers will be exchanged. The réduction of uncertainty 
could facilitate more open dialogue between the parties. Third, attention 
and discussion is focused on the application of the formula. This introduces 
more rationality into the process and de-emphasizes, though by no means 
éliminâtes, the power dimension of the process. 
The use of common, and mutually acceptable, data is another innova-
tion which may help transform the bargaining process. 
Objective data can contribute greatly to productive problem solving and 
to the resolution of disagreement. ... Most persons and groups... are 
quite prepared to accept facts and be guided by them in their search for a 
solution to the problem14. 
The importance of the parties applying common data in negotiations has 
been recognized in a number of situations. The requirement for the Educa-
tion Relations Commission under Bill 100 in Ontario to provide neutral 
data to the two parties in teacher-board bargaining is one illustration. Data 
does not résolve labour-management conflict but it should not be an addi-
tional cause for conflict. Therefore, the production of neutral or joint data 
is important to labour peace in that light. 
ATTITUDINAL REFORM 
There are a host of practical techniques that could be introduced to 
help facilitate attitudinal change. Some corne from expérience in other con-
flict settings; the origin of others is expérimentation in inter-group relations 
in the behavioural sciences. Walton, for instance, has outlined some of the 
ingrédients for attitude change in inter-group relations15. He notes that one 
method is to reduce the parties' perception of threat from the other side. 
There are several pragmatic steps which could be taken to do this in nego-
tiations. 
Removal of Bilatéral Threat 
Threats and counterthreats in bargaining arise predominantly because 
of the fact that at the end of the negotiation process there is the possibility 
of économie sanctions or, in some cases, compulsory arbitration. The 
threats typically refer to the possibility of stalemate. It is ironie that in a 
14 LIKERT, Rensis and Jane LIKERT, op. cit., p. 162. 
15 WALTON, Richard, "Two Stratégies for Social Change and Their Dilemmas", The 
Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, vol. 1, no. 2, April-May-June, 1965, p. 170. 
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broader context than the immédiate set of negotiations such threat may be 
counterproductive. Bilatéral threat prevents the parties from moving to 
joint problem solving and maximizing joint gain. The first expérimental 
évidence on this point was provided by Deutsch and Krauss16. 
Regardless of explanation, the implications of this research are very com-
pelling. They strongly suggest that the less opportunity for threat any two 
parties hâve in negotiating a settlement, the more likely they are to share a 
profit in their negotiations. International settlements would be more pro-
fitable if neither party were able to threaten the other with war. Under 
certain conditions unions might even fare better without strikes...17 
The apparent reason is that, if a person uses threat to intimidate., the person 
threatened will then react with hostility, counterthreat and résistance. 
With bilatéral threat présent it is almost impossible to bring about long 
run attitudinal change. However, what would happen to attitudinal rela-
tionship if labour and management removed serious bilatéral threat from 
collective bargaining? What would happen if the parties imposed conven-
tional arbitration or final-offer arbitration on negotiations prior to their 
start? The above research suggests that much of the dysfunctional activity 
would disappear and coopérative relationships would be more likely to 
develop. Voluntary arbitration has shown enough promise to warrant adop-
tion, particularly if coupled with other procédural reforms. Indeed, volun-
tary arbitration may be an important first step for procédural and at-
titudinal change. 
Reducing the Number of Participants at the Table 
One of the most visible features of win-lose conflict is the large number 
of participants on both sides of the table. As a simple rule of thumb, the 
larger the numbers at the table, other things being equal, the more adver-
sarial the relationship. In many cases, personnel are brought in simply 
because both sides pursue bargaining in warlike terms. Indeed, bargaining is 
often viewed in military terms. "Body prolifération" is not an atypical oc-
currence in collective bargaining. That is, additional personnel are brought 
to the table to make sure the "battle" is fought on equal terms. 
16 See Morton DEUTSCH and R.M. KRAUSS, "The Effect of Threat Upon Interper-
sonal Bargaining", Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 61, 1960, pp. 168-175. 
17 GERGEN, Kenneth J., The Psychology of Behavioral Exchange, Reading, Mass., 
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969, p. 70. 
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Each additional "body", then, may be viewed in terms of adding 
threat potential. According to Walton, one of the ways to bring about at-
titudinal change is to minimize the other side's perception of potential 
threat from your side. Reducing the numbers of personnel directly involved 
in negotiations would be a start in this direction. Moreover, a significant 
réduction in the numbers at the main table is one concrète act which could 
probably be taken in most situations without any stratégie or tactical loss. 
In many cases, bargaining committees from a tactical standpoint are, if 
anything, too large. 
New Seating Arrangements 
Attitudes may also be changed by attempting to minimize perceived 
différences between the two groups. A manifestation of adversary bargain-
ing is that the parties physically.group themselves in a "we-they" arrange-
ment. It has been demonstrated that conflict is promoted by such seating ar-
rangements18. Some hâve noted that physical séparation is a precursor of 
conflict. Filey, for example, has stated: 
...spacial arrangements will themselves provoke or elicit various forms of 
behavior. Not only that but it has been found that the greater the distance 
between the two parties the less friendly they are perceived to be19. 
By agreeing on new, more informai, less adversarial seating arrange-
ments, the parties may be able to introduce an improved climate at the 
table. The single team bargaining concept entails precisely this idea. In cer-
tain circumstances no table is used or, if one is necessary, a round table is 
introduced. The élimination of the single spokesman ploy, generally con-
sidered functional and necessary for collective bargaining, is another stra-
tegy of a similar nature that has been introduced in single team bargaining. 
The basic idea is to maximize informality and to minimize the "we-they" 
atmosphère. The single team concept now has been used in a variety of set-
tings including teacher-board bargaining in Ontario. It is not a "cure-air* 
for our industrial relations problems but the concept does warrant serious 
examination. 
18 RUSSO, N.F., "Connotation of Seating Arrangements", Cornelï Journal of Social 
Relations, 2, 1967, pp. 37-44. 
19 FILEY, Alan C , Interpersonal Conflict Resolution, Glenview, Illinois, Scott, 
Foresman and Company, p. 79. 
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Personnel Exchanges 
Encouraging inter-group contact on a broader scale is a method often 
used to improve relationships. International exchanges often take place to 
improve inter-country relationships. The goal of such exchanges is to 
develop empathy and understanding between two groups. This has rarely, if 
ever, been done in industrial relations. Yet there is no reason why young 
people in personnel and industrial relations could not spend a period of time 
(say, three to six months) in the employ of the union with which they must 
work on a daily basis. Conversely, there is no reason why union officiais, 
particularly young union stewards, could not spend some time in a person-
nel and industrial relations department. The government, too, could offer 
sabbaticals to unionists and industrial relations managers to spend a year in 
a management or labour organization. 
Union Leaders on Board of Directors and Other Forms of Participation 
Attitudes may also be changed through demonstrating the mutual 
dependence of the two groups in conflict by enhancing the status of the rival 
group and by encouraging openness between the parties. In this context, the 
appointment of union leaders to an organization's Board of Directors is 
conducive to improved relationships. Trust between the parties is a neces-
sary ingrédient which may be developed by such appointments. It is an idea, 
of course, which has been used extensively, by government fiât, in West 
Germany and other countries. There are isolated cases of such participation 
in Canada as well. The récent appointment of UAW Président Douglas 
Fraser to the Board of Directors of Chrysler Corporation is the rnost récent 
North American example of this idea. 
The major obstacles to thèse appointments are the aspects of confi-
dentiality of information, conflicts of interest for the union officiai, and the 
gênerai lack of désire on the part of trade union officiais to become involv-
ed with the operating problems of an organization. It is an innovation that 
is likely to increase only on a voluntary basis and only to a very limited ex-
tent. This and other forms of formai participation (e.g., profit sharing 
plans and the Scanlon plan) are often proposed as solutions to industrial 
conflict. Some would argue, for example, that worker participation is the 
essential ingrédient for improved labour-management relations20. Others 
20 NIGHTINGALE, D.V., "Industrial Democracy: A Strategy for Improving Produc-
tivity and Labor-Management Relations", The Business Quarterly, Autumn 1976, pp. 36-42. 
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suggest that in North America worker participation is unlikely and there-
fore its impact will be minimal21. While not a panacea, it does seem clear 
that, regardless of its prospects, worker participation is a concept that pro-
mises increased trust between labour and management and the intégration 
of their interests. Therefore, it is a relevant strategy to consider for attitu-
dinal change. 
Innovative Joint Committees 
Programs on an on-going basis outside of collective bargaining may be 
mounted to induce problem-solving behaviour and a greater degree of open-
ness. Joint committees which operate on a year-round basis can be run with 
a problem-solving style and thus reduce conflict and introduce new attitudes 
between the parties. There hâve been numerous programs of consultation; 
some programs hâve been marginally successful and others less so. But the 
concept has remained static for years. What would seem to be needed now 
are imaginative bold experiments to generate more openness and trust 
which, in turn, will spill over to collective bargaining. 
A model program has been mounted in a dying industry ~ the U.S. 
Railroad industry. In 1975, with financial aid from the Association of 
American Railroads, the Fédéral Railroad Administration, the Missouri 
Pacific Railroad and various railroad labour organizations, the "St. Louis 
Project*' began. This is a program of coopérative action outside of normal 
collective bargaining. It entails a program of joint labour-management ex-
periments involving changes in opérations at Missouri Pacific's (Mopac) St. 
Louis terminal. The Mopac terminal was selected, from many possible sites, 
as a location for innovative experiments. 
The following approach has been adopted by the parties. 
1. The parties identify barriers to terminal efficiency and service relia-
bility. 
2. They propose changes in management and labour practices (including 
changes in the contract) and in government régulations that affect the 
opération of the terminal. 
3. Spécifie changes in opérations are introduced. 
21 STRAUSS, G., "Quality of Worklife and Participation As Bargaining Issues", in 
press. 
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4. They conduct on-line experiments designed to test the effectiveness of 
the proposed solutions. The changes or experiments are considered as 
temporary only. 
5. The cost-savings become known and the unions involved then hâve the 
option of negotiating permanent change. 
The problem has obvious advantages. First, it has demonstrated some 
clear-cut improvements in efficiency with both sides being better off22. Se-
cond, it has improved communication between local labour and manage-
ment by a séries of regular meetings between the employées and operating 
officiais. It, therefore, ihvolves many members of both groups in inter-
group contact. As a conséquence it facilitâtes attitudinal change. Third, the 
emphasis throughout the process is on problem solving. 
Behavioral Science Intervention 
Experiments hâve been conducted which illustrate the existence of 
gross distortion in the perceptions of labour and management of one an-
other which, in turn, adversely influence their attitude toward the other 
side. In a thorough pièce of research it was demonstrated that labour and 
management stéréotype each other. Haire states: 
...this distortion is sufficient to give rise to considérable misunderstan-
ding between them of the subject matter of their conversations. It does 
not suggest that this is the sole source of différence of opinion between 
labour and management in negotiation. The kind of distortion demon-
strated hère should probably be viewed primarily as a barrier to com-
munication which makes doubly difficult the problem of resolving dif-
férences of opinion or purpose23. 
The literature on organizational development and change offers con-
cepts to facilitate the development of new perceptions. First, inter-group 
labs hâve been used extensively to treat win-lose conflict between depart-
ments in organizations. Behavioral interventions4nto situations of inter-
group conflict outside labour-management relationsiiave been successful 
and impressive. The lab approach involves trying to indtice problem-solving 
relations by cutting through the tensions and conflict which exist between 
two antagonistic groups. Because inter-group labs may seem unrealistic or 
inapplicable in treating labour-management conflict, it is worth noting 
22 " A Coopéra t ive P r o g r a m of Experiments Involving Changes in Rai l road Opéra t ions : 
St. Louis P r o j e c t " , 1975 Progress Report by St. Louis Project T e a m Task Force on Rail 
Transpor ta t ion of the Labor -Management Commit tee , Apri l 15, 1976. 
23 H A I R E , Mason , "Role-Percept ions in Labor -Management Relat ions: An Expéri-
mental A p p r o a c h " , Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 8, 1955, p p . 204-206. 
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that the concept has been used successfully in that context. According to 
reports, perceptions and attitudes were changed, and because of this a 
problem-solving orientation was adopted by labour and management repré-
sentatives24. The Canadian post office (Canada Post) has recently used the 
inter-group approach with the letter carriers ' union in an attempt to im-
prove their relationship. Both sides report a significant improvement in the 
union-management relationship. 
PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In Canada, we hâve reached the point where little of an additional 
nature can be done to aid collective bargaining by direct compulsory inter-
vention and, as noted, viable compulsory strike substitutes do not seem to 
exist although further research is necessary on this point. More importantly, 
such approaches deal directly with strikes and lockouts and in doing so treat 
collective bargaining in terms of its "power" dimension only. Essentially ig-
nored is the attitudinal side of the process and the relationship between the 
parties. 
An attitudinal change strategy implies a very différent rôle for govern-
ment. Through various procédures and processes, government could at-
tempt to increase the level of attraction and trust between the parties and 
hence reduce overt conflict. Government influence under this strategy is less 
direct, less visible and, therefore, less appealing to the politician. Education 
and assistance are the primary tools. The U.S. Fédéral Médiation and Con-
ciliation Service has a program entitled Relationships by Objectives (RBO) 
which follows this philosophy and the Ontario Ministry of Labour is cur-
rently developing a similar program. 
If this approach is to work a government agency must start by retrain-
ing its own agents in negotiations, i.e., the cadre of third party neutrals who 
are appointed to résolve disputes each year. Those who serve as third parties 
are typically individuals with a background in law and/or those who hâve 
training as industrial relations practitioners (on the trade union or manage-
ment side). Many of thèse are able third parties, but it is possible to move 
beyond the haphazard sélection and development of third parties, whose 
training cornes essentially from expérience in traditional adversary bargain-
ing25, and, instead, qualify similar individuals through classroom and on-
24 See R. BLAKE, H . S H E P A R D and J. M O U T O N , Managing Intergroup Conflict in 
Industry, Hous ton , Gulf Publishing Company , 1964, p p . 155-195. 
25 See Kenneth KRESSEL, Labor Médiation: An Exploratory Survey, Association of 
Labor Médiation Agencies, 1972. 
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the-job training to be not only "seulement seekers" and "power brokers*' 
but also "peacemakers" and "change agents''. In short, they should bring 
the skills of conventional plus préventive médiation to a dispute. The task 
involves not just trying to find a settlement but also identifying and expos-
ing the "hidden agenda", important emotional issues, perceptual distor-
tions, and communication barriers; gaining concessions and face-saving 
solutions which take care of both the overt and concealed factors dividing 
the parties; and recommending new processes, techniques and behaviours. 
This implies much more formai and sophisticated training than currently 
offered by government agencies in Canada. 
Préventive médiation differs from conventional médiation in that in-
tervention takes place before crises develop and also, often outside of col-
lective bargaining. In fact, préventive médiation has been called ' 'noncrisis 
médiation" in that it encompasses those activities of mediators not related 
to contract deadlines or to médiation of spécifie grievances. For example, it 
might be concerned with a faulty grievance procédure, consultation, or 
prenegotiation joint committees set up to résolve troublesome issues con-
fronting the parties' future negotiations. Or, it might involve a post nego-
tiation committee formed to résolve an issue that could not be resolved 
through regular negotiations. 
The difficulties of préventive médiation are well-known and need not 
be dealt with hère. The basic weakness is that the parties will rarely request 
médiation, of any kind, prior to a crisis. And, like marriage counselling, 
préventive médiation will not work if forced on the parties. However, the 
conventional mediator is generally in contact with the parties when their 
negotiations are in a critical stage and he is, therefore, an important player 
in that he can encourage the use of préventive médiation when the parties 
may feel the need for such an initiative. The impact of préventive média-
tion, in short, may first dépend on the persuasiveness of the conventional 
mediator in convincing the parties to innovate, and then on the ensuing 
utility to the parties of the préventive médiation process. 
If préventive médiation begins, the necessary third party skills, it must 
be reiterated, are by no means identical to those required in crisis bargain-
ing. The analogy is closer to a marriage counsellor than a power broker. 
Many industrial relations practitioners may think the analogy naive, but the 
processes are distinctly différent and the fact is that professional psycho-
logists hâve been able to intervene in labour-management affairs and im-
prove communications so that each side could see the point of view of their 
opposition more clearly. This change, in turn, substantially reduced tension 
and hostility26. 
26 MUENCH, George, "A Clinical Psychologist's Treatment of Labor-Management 
Conflicts", Personnel Psychology, vol. 13, 1960, pp. 165-172. 
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The desirability for much more training of mediators, and training of a 
différent variety, is not intended to argue against on-the-job expérience. 
The necessity for expérience in impasse situations is clear. The argument, 
rather, is that experienced mediators should acquire clinical and process 
skills through training. It is hère that government and government agencies 
can play a vital rôle. 
The idea of using indirect government influence to bring about change, 
of course, is not new in Canada. To this point, its impact has been minute 
because it has not been effectively directed at the establishment level. Joint 
consultation, for example, has been fairly actively pursued by the fédéral 
government and some provincial governments, as well. Manitoba's Labour-
Management Committee (Woods Committee) which is a sélect committee of 
leading union and employer représentatives in the province has been one of 
the most successful attempts of this type, and much is to be learned from 
such an undertaking. However, Kovaks points out one of the weaknesses of 
joint consultation practised at this level. 
The employers' group does not hâve an organizational structure for com-
mitting them to provincial policy and industrial relations is only one area 
among many to occupy the attention of management. Therefore, only by 
example will any expérience gained through joint provincial councils filter 
through to individual employers27. 
Over and above that, the subject matter of such consultation is limited. 
To illustrate, the focus of joint councils might be limited to an examination 
of labour législation. This has positive potential but, at best, constitutes 
very limited change. The same is true of other possible approaches which at-
tempt to introduce change from the top, such as tripartitism. Discussions 
among top union, management and government leaders would likely be 
superficial because those involved, particularly for management, are not 
likely to be the important decision-makers. 
Consultation of the right variety, nevertheless, is useful. The emphasis 
should be on the establishment level or, in some cases, such as construction 
or hospitals, on the industry or sector level. For instance, through third par-
ty or other government initiatives the parties in construction might be per-
suaded to sit down and work out, with third party assistance, new pro-
cédures for the prompt and informai resolution of jurisdictional disputes. 
This could lead to other labour-management innovations in the industry. 
Again, the importance of having well-trained and fully informed third par-
ties who hâve the respect of the parties is obvious. 
27 KOVAKS, Aranka E., "Joint Labour-Management Councils", in S.M.A. Hameed 
(éd.), Canadian Industrial Relations: A Book of Readings, Toronto, Butterworth & Co. 
(Canada) Ltd., 1975, p. 49. 
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SOME FINAL OBSERVATIONS 
Structural reforms and public policy changes in dispute seulement 
methods are important change stratégies and should not be denigrated. 
Thèse experiments and changes are healthy and sometimes helpful. But they 
constitute little more than tinkering at the margin and bring about change 
of, at best, a tangential nature. Furthermore, any improvement may not be 
long lasting because the change is unlikely to hâve dealt with attitudes and 
perceptions. Structural change, in particular, simply introduces a new and 
uneasy equilibrium in power relationships. Pressures quickly build to 
change or modify the new, reformed structure. 
With respect to public policy specifically, the fédéral and provincial 
governments hâve shown little inclination to experiment with the basic légal 
framework regulating industrial relations in Canada. With a few exceptions 
governments in Canada over the past twenty-five years hâve not forced 
massive change on the parties. It seems safe to assume that, at both levels, 
government is now unlikely to introduce dramatic innovations particularly 
in the areas of dispute resolution techniques (such as arbitration) or indus-
trial democraey. As noted, even if government does take action on the 
public policy or structural front, it is unlikely that the changes will deal with 
the fundamental causes of labour strife. 
But government does hâve a rôle to play and a responsibility in improv-
ing industrial relations practices and procédures. At the same time., from the 
above, it would seem that the best way, indeed perhaps the only way, to 
significantly improve industrial relations in Canada (and indirectly our 
économie performance) is through procédural and attitudinal reform. If the 
major opportunity for real change résides with thèse two stratégies, a heavy 
responsibility obviously lies in the hands of labour and management. To 
stimulate change, however, government should provide much more in the 
way of professional services and, perhaps, financial incentives to those par-
ties who innovate in the area of industrial relations practices. 
Finally, it seems clear that to be effective an attack by government, and 
by the parties per se, on labour-management problems must be made con-
gruently on two fronts. That is, attempts to reform the bargaining process 
will not be long lasting unless inter-party attitudes are improved, and vice 
versa. Hère it should be stressed that attitudinal change must go beyond the 
individuals at the bargaining table. If attitudinal reform is to be seriously 
pursued it must include labour and management officiais who deal with one 
another on a day-to-day basis. This suggests the need to train and equip first 
Une supervisors, in particular, with problem solving skills. At the same 
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time, attitudinal innovations such as those outlined in a previous section, 
even if jointly introduced by labour and management to induce a better 
relationship, must be protected from the harsh realities and pressures of the 
bargaining table. The most effective way to operationalize the latter is 
through reforming the bargaining process so that win-lose conflict is muted 
at the table and does not spill over to day-to-day relationships and poison 
new initiatives. A marriage of the two stratégies, therefore, would seem to 
be not only désirable but also necessary if there is to be an improved in-
dustrial relations climate. 
Les pouvoirs publics et la paix industrielle 
On exprime des inquiétudes au sujet de l'état de santé de notre régime de 
négociations collectives et de relations professionnelles en général. De nombreuses 
suggestions ont été faites pour améliorer le dossier de nos relations professionnelles, 
mais il n'y a eu que peu d'efforts, s'il y en a eu, pour lier diverses propositions ou en 
faire la synthèse. Cette étude offre un cadre pour l'analyse des stratégies de rechange 
dans les relations de travail. 
Le vaste domaine des stratégies de rechange peut se diviser en quatre groupes ou 
catégories: 
1) la réforme politique; 
2) la réforme des structures; 
3) la réforme des mécanismes; 
4) la réforme des comportements. 
La réforme politique suppose des initiatives de la part du gouvernement pour 
favoriser le processus des négociations collectives. Le gouvernement peut aider de 
trois façons. D'abord, les organismes gouvernementaux peuvent faciliter le proces-
sus de négociation en fournissant l'aide de tierces parties (enquêtes factuelles). En se-
cond lieu, le gouvernement peut proposer et imposer des mécanismes de règlement 
des différends qui remplacent ou modifient les sanctions économiques auxquelles les 
parties recourent. Troisièmement, le gouvernement peut encourager la coopération 
entre les employeurs et les syndicats et favoriser la paix industrielle en fournissant des 
données objectives et en encourageant la formation et la compétence des tierces 
parties. 
Le but de la réforme des structures est d'élargir l'aire des négociations ou des 
conventions collectives de façon à diminuer le nombre des grèves. Le passage de la 
négociation locale à la négociation provinciale par législation en est un exemple. On 
peut en venir à des unités de négociations plus étendues, soit par l'action du gouver-
nement, soit à l'initiative des parties. 
Les deux réformes ci-dessus se rapportent aux effets des conflits de travail (les 
grèves) essentiellement par des techniques de règlement des différends et par la 
modification des unités de négociation. Les parties peuvent aussi adopter divers 
types de réformes au processus de négociation. Le recours à l'arbitrage volontaire, 
des efforts en vue de procéder à la négociation continue, des négociations anticipées, 
la fixation de dates-cibles pour le règlement, une formule commune de détermination 
des salaires sont autant d'exemples d'innovations possibles dans ce domaine. 
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Enfin, un changement fondamental dans l'orientation des parties Tune envers 
l'autre est une méthode qui retient de plus en plus l'attention. La réforme des atti-
tudes peut comporter l'accord entre les parties pour repousser le recours à la grève ou 
au lock-out, diminuer le nombre de participants à la table des négociations, faire un 
nouvel aménagement des sièges à cette même table, mettre au point des échanges de 
personnel entre les parties, recourir à des comités conjoints pour aider à la solution 
des problèmes ou encore fournir des formes variées d'intervention s'inspirant du 
behaviorisme. Des innovations quant à la qualité de la vie au travail entrent aussi 
dans cette catégorie. 
Jusqu'ici, les réformes de caractère politique ont eu tendance à considérer les 
négociations collectives comme une lutte pour le «pouvoir» par des formes directes 
d'intervention. Aussi, au Canada, avons-nous atteint un point où peu peut être fait 
pour favoriser la négociation par intervention coercitive et, en même temps, les 
substituts obligatoires viables à la grève ne semblent pas exister. Plus, le changement 
structurel opère, au mieux, des réformes et des améliorations temporaires. On a 
complètement ignoré en matière de politique publique le côté comportement du pro-
cessus de négociation et de rapports entre les parties. 
En conséquence, les gouvernements devraient bien davantage mettre l'accent 
sur les deux dernières stratégies (la réforme des mécanismes et la réforme des com-
portements), car il s'agit d'approches beaucoup moins directes que celles qui con-
sistent à essayer d'amorcer des changements par des modifications à la législation. 
Les premiers agents de changement dans un tel cas devraient être les tierces parties 
neutres du gouvernement, ce qui implique qu'elles doivent recevoir une formation 
plus large et plus intensive que celle qu'elles reçoivent actuellement. 
Finalement, il semble clair que, pour être efficace et durable, l'initiative des par-
ties en vue d'améliorer leurs rapports doive porter sur les deux points — la réforme 
des mécanismes et la réforme des comportements. Une combinaison des deux stra-
tégies semblerait, non seulement désirable, mais nécessaire, si l'on veut une amélio-
ration significative du climat dans notre système de relations professionnelles. 
